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ABSTRACT
Following four elections in three years, on 16 April 2017 Turkish 
voters once again went to the polls - this time under the emergency 
law established after the failed coup attempt of July 2016 - to vote 
on constitutional amendments aimed at replacing the existing 
parliamentary system with an executive presidency. This article 
reviews the content of the proposed constitutional amendments, 
analyses the campaign including the strategies employed by the main 
political actors in the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ camps and the resource advantages 
enjoyed by the ruling party, assesses the electoral performance of 
both sides through a summary of results from provincial areas and 
geographical regions, and considers how Turkish politics are likely to 
take shape under the new system.
Following a series of elections—two parliamentary, one local, and one presidential—in three 
years, Turkish voters once again went to the polls on 16 April 2017 to give their verdict on a 
set of constitutional amendments that would replace the existing parliamentary system with 
an executive presidency. The 1982 Constitution had already been amended numerous times 
and these changes were put to popular vote on four other occasions (Kalaycıoğlu 2012), two 
of which occurred under the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party) 
that has ruled continuously since the 2002 general elections. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
and the ruling AKP campaigned forcefully for the ‘Yes’ vote by taking advantage of the uneven 
playing field in relation to the opposition (OSCE 2017) which had also been the case during 
the June and November 2015 general elections (Esen & Gümüşçü 2016; Sayarı 2016b). 
Meanwhile, the ‘No’ camp was composed of various political parties including the main 
opposition CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - Republican People’s Party) and pro-Kurdish HDP 
(Halkların Demokrasi Partisi - People’s Democratic Party) together with groups of different 
ideological leanings. Despite the government’s unfair advantages and an alliance with the 
MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - National Action Party), the ‘Yes’ side prevailed by only a small 
margin (as shown in Table 1), denying Erdoğan the sweeping endorsement he had expected. 
Compared to their vote in the November 2015 elections, the parties supporting the ‘Yes’ 
camp incurred major losses in the 2017 referendum (see Table 2).
The 2017 referendum took place in the midst of an ongoing political crisis marked by 
several key developments. The most recent crisis started with the June 2015 elections when 
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the AKP lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since coming to power in 2002(Öniş 
2016; Kalaycıoğlu 2017). In Summer 2015 the peace process with regard to the Kurdish 
insurgency came to an abrupt end, and the AKP called for snap elections in the midst of 
increasing violence in the country. In November 2015, the AKP recovered most of its electoral 
losses and regained its parliamentary majority, yet the party failed to restore stability. The 
AKP government increased its counter-insurgency measures, cracked down on academia, 
the media, and civil society, and President Erdoğan replaced the then Prime Minister 
Davutoğlu with the more loyal Binali Yıldırım. In July 2016 the political crisis took a new turn 
when a junta within the Turkish military attempted to unseat Erdoğan and the AKP 
government (Esen & Gümüşçü 2017), killing 250 civilians and injuring hundreds. The AKP 
government, thanks to its parliamentary majority, declared a state of emergency in July 
2016, and President Erdoğan exerted his control over the cabinet as de facto head of the 
state and the executive and started to rule by decrees without much parliamentary oversight. 
These decrees led to the sacking of tens of thousands of civil servants and teachers, the 
appointment of trustees to firms of various sizes, purges in academia, as well as the closure 
of several civil society associations and media outlets, as the government carried out mass 
arrests of civil servants, journalists, and opposition leaders.
The referendum was thus held in a context in which the state of emergency allowed 
provincial governors and security forces to restrict freedom of speech, movement, and 
assembly. As such, the campaign period confirmed the findings of recent studies on 
democratic breakdown in Turkey (Somer 2016, Esen & Gümüşçü 2016) and further indicated 
the consolidation of the rising competitive authoritarian regime in its stead (Esen & Gümüşçü 
2016, Özbudun 2015, Sayarı 2016a). Attesting to this fact, the AKP ran a one-sided campaign 
aided by the state apparatus that dominated the media and public space.
However, the broad nature of the ‘No’ camp helped the government’s critics to overcome, 
at least partly, these enormous resource advantages enjoyed by the ruling party. For the first 
time during its rule, the AKP was confronted by a large coalition of parties and groups that 
had little in common, both in terms of policy agendas and ideological backgrounds. Except 





Table 2. the 2015 election results for the parties supporting the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps in the april 2017 
constitutional referendum.
notes: the parties that did not pass the parliamentary threshold in these two elections received a total of 4.8 per cent of 
the vote in June 2015 and 2.7 per cent in november 2015. in the referendum the extra-parliamentary forces were divided 
between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps.
YES camp AKP MHP AKP-MHP combined
June 2015 40.9 16.3 57.2
nov 2015 49.5 11.9 61.4
no camp
chp hdp chp-hdp combined
June 2015 24.9 13.1 38.0
nov 2015 25.3 10.7 36.0
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for the MHP and two minor extra-parliamentary parties, all the opposition parties rejected 
the proposed amendments. The opposition used a similar framing to oppose the proposed 
constitutional amendments, accusing Erdoğan of aiming to establish one-man rule. The 
ideologically heterogeneous nature of the ‘No’ camp disabled the AKP government’s attempts 
to criminalise its critics and benefit from political polarisation.1 The results indicate that half 
of the electorate consolidated against the executive presidency, an ominous sign for 
President Erdoğan. Moreover, the government’s victory was disputed due to serious 
allegations of electoral fraud that, given the close margin, may have swayed the outcome 
of the referendum. The decision of the YSK (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu - High Election Council) to 
count ballots without an official stamp ex post facto caused a major stir in the ‘No’ camp. The 
serious charges of electoral fraud also compromised the integrity of future elections.
This article provides an analysis of the 2017 referendum and its long-term implications 
for Turkish politics. It will first review the content of the proposed constitutional amendments. 
The article will then analyse the campaign period to review the different strategies employed 
by the main political actors in the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ camps. In this section, the focus will be on 
the resource advantages enjoyed by the ruling party and the uneven playing field in Turkish 
politics. The following section will assess the electoral performances of both sides through 
a summary of results from provincial areas and geographical regions. The final section 
concludes with a discussion on how Turkish politics are likely to shape up under the new 
system.
Why constitutional change?
Indeed, the political elite in Turkey had long reached a consensus on the necessity of 
replacing the existing Constitution penned by the military junta in 1982 with a civil and 
democratic alternative. With this aim, after the 2011 general election, the four parties 
represented in parliament—namely the pro-Islamic AKP, secular centre-left CHP, ultra-
nationalist MHP, and the then parliamentary representative of the pro-Kurdish forces BDP2 
(Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi - Peace and Democracy Party)—formed a constitutional commission 
and agreed on a partial draft of 60 articles. The parties continued working on a new 
Constitution in the aftermath of the 2015 general elections, but the commission was 
dissolved in February 2016 after the CHP categorically rejected the instatement of a 
presidential system, which the AKP persistently advocated (BBC Türkçe 2016). The AKP then 
moved to write its own draft Constitution. Yet, the party lacked the qualified majority of 
two-thirds of MPs required to amend the Constitution. Instead it sought the support of 330 
MPs (out of the total of 550) required to submit the constitutional package to a referendum. 
Having only 316 seats in the parliament, the AKP needed some support from the opposition 
to achieve this majority. This process, stalled until the July 2016 failed coup attempt, gained 
momentum when the MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli declared his support for heightened powers 
for the president on the condition that the first four articles of the existing constitution 
remained intact.3
Accepting these conditions, the AKP single-handedly prepared a draft Constitution and 
dismissed the earlier consensus reached by the four major parties on 60 articles. The central 
focus of the new draft was to instate an executive presidency, which would institutionalise 
Erdoğan’s de facto yet unconstitutional power and influence over the executive. Composed 
of 18 amendments affecting 72 articles, the package proposed a number of critical changes 
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in the Turkish political system: (1) the executive and the legislative branches are separated 
and the president is both the head of the state and the executive with no separate office of 
the prime minister; (2) the president is directly elected in popular elections every five years 
by a majority of the popular vote and can serve two terms, with a third term allowed in a 
case where the parliament or the president calls for early elections during the president’s 
second term; (3) the president appoints and dismisses his (unspecified number of ) deputies, 
the ministers, and high ranking officials without parliamentary oversight or approval; (4) the 
president can issue executive orders on a wide range of issues—including the creation of 
new ministries, organisation of local governance, and other aspects of social and economic 
life—except issues pertaining to fundamental rights and liberties and those already 
organised by existing legislation, with presidential decrees remaining in effect until the 
parliament overrides them with legislation; (5) the parliament retains its authority to legislate, 
pass the budget, and declare war, yet with limited oversight over the executive branch: it 
can submit written questions to the president’s deputies and to government ministers but 
not to the president; (6) the number of MPs is increased from 550 to 600 and parliament can 
initiate an investigation into the president and ministers with a three-fifths majority; (7) the 
number of members of the Constitutional Court is decreased to 15 and of the Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors to 13, with the president appointing five members to the Council 
and the parliament electing another five while the minister and deputy minister of justice 
are ex officio members of the Council; (8) the age limit for MPs is lowered to 18; (9) martial 
law and military courts are abolished.4
Once the commission forwarded the proposal to parliament, the AKP used its majority 
to dominate the debates. As a result, in the fast-track discussions, the opposition MPs found 
limited opportunity to discuss the individual articles, while the speaker of the parliament 
did not ensure the broadcasting of the sessions on public television, ultimately denying the 
people access to parliamentary deliberations.5 Finally, the MPs of both the AKP and MHP 
cast open votes on the package, violating the norms of secret voting for constitutional 
amendments (Cumhuriyet 2017a). With the support of the MHP leadership, despite many 
heated discussions in parliament, the constitutional package received 339 votes, opening 
the path for a new constitutional referendum. Both the AKP and MHP leaders were confident 
that the majority of the Turkish people would endorse the package given their electoral 
support of 60 per cent in the the November 2015 elections (see Table 2). Indeed public 
opinion surveys prior to the referendum indicated a close relationship between partisanship 
and support for a presidential system (Aytaç et al. 2017).
The ‘Yes’ campaign
The ‘Yes’ bloc was primarily composed of the ruling AKP and the ultra-nationalist MHP with 
some support from a few fringe parties, namely the ultra-nationalist Islamist BBP (Büyük 
Birlik Partisi - Great Unity Party) and the Kurdish-Islamist Hüda-Par (Hür-Dava Partisi - Free 
Cause Party).6 As expected, the AKP led the ‘Yes’ campaign since President Erdoğan had been 
a vocal advocate for a presidential system in Turkey and was the principal proponent of the 
system change in his party. Both PM Yıldırım and President Erdoğan, despite the constitutional 
provision that the president should be non-partisan, campaigned in favour of the referendum 
package. Leaders held joint rallies in five major cities and complementary rallies in more 
than 75 (out of 81) cities. Erdoğan visited more than 30 cities while Yıldırım visited another 
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47 for the ‘Yes’ campaign (Sabah 2017). Erdoğan’s rallies were either sponsored by the ‘Yes 
Platform’—since the president is supposed to be non-partisan according to the 1982 
Constitution and cannot campaign on behalf of a political party—or financed by the state 
as public ceremonies marking grand openings.
AKP: strong presidency for political stability and effective governance
The AKP’s official referendum campaign—as run by the party leaders and supported by 
Erdoğan—highlighted a number of issues. First, the party emphasised governmental stability 
under a presidential system over potential flaws of the existing parliamentary system with 
a strong president. To that effect, the AKP underlined the need to replace the duality in the 
executive branch (embodied by the prime minister and the president) with a strong 
presidency, which would govern the country for a fixed term of five years. Likewise, a 
presidential system would alleviate the uncertainties associated with the parliamentary 
system. As such, Turkey could, the AKP hoped, avoid repeating the weak and ineffective 
coalition governments of the 1990s, which were often blamed for the economic troubles 
and political instability of what many called ‘the lost decade’. Secondly, the party argued, 
the parliamentary system suffered from a particular democratic deficit since it opens the 
political system to the undue influence of ‘tutelary’ powers, i.e. the military, the media bosses, 
judiciary. Such influence, according to the party, was particularly intense under coalition 
governments, which were often formed ‘behind closed doors’. Therefore, throughout its 
campaign, the AKP blamed the parliamentary system for the military interventions of 1960, 
1971, and 1980, the economic underperformance of the 1990s, the economic-political crisis 
of 2001, and the post-election violence in June 2015 (Habertürk 2017b; T24 2017a).
The presidential system, on the other hand, the party suggested, is a panacea for such 
flaws. A strong executive presidency, the AKP promised, would translate the people’s will 
directly into presidential authority (bypassing the representatives in parliament) at the 
expense of tutelary powers—the military and the judiciary—hence increasing the democratic 
legitimacy of the system. The party also argued that the democratic quality of the regime 
would further improve since the president has to appeal to broad segments of society to 
win a majority of the votes. A strong presidency would also deliver effective governance, 
circumvent bureaucratic hurdles, provide governmental stability, ensure economic growth, 
increase investments and employment, provide heightened security, and put an end to 
terrorism (AKP 2017). It is noteworthy that the AKP leaders avoided discussing the potential 
gridlock that could arise in a case where the president and the parliamentary majority came 
from different political parties.
Besides these promises, the AKP referendum campaign also rested on delegitimisation 
of the ‘No’ vote. The AKP relied heavily on negative campaigning by discrediting and 
delegitimising those who contested the proposed changes, evoking a deep polarity between 
‘the people’ (yes) and ‘its enemies’ (no). Accordingly, PM Yıldırım, President Erdoğan and 
several government ministers invoked conservative nationalist rhetoric to portray naysayers 
as traitors and terrorists with the aim of receiving the support of undecided voters within 
the conservative-nationalist constituency. Minister of Justice Bozdağ, for instance, claimed 
that all terrorist organisations—including FETÖ, DHKP-C, the PKK7— and legal political 
parties—such as the CHP and the HDP—were working together to defeat the referendum 
package (T24 2017b). PM Yıldırım in the same vein frequently asserted that the AKP was 
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supporting constitutional change because the PKK, FETÖ, and the HDP were against it (NTV 
2017). President Erdoğan on a number of occasions equated naysayers with those who 
attempted the failed coup in July 2016 (T24 2017c) and claimed that voting ‘No’ in the 
referendum would be a vote in favour of the PKK, as those who contest ‘the people’s will’ 
and the Turkish flag indeed oppose the constitutional package (T24 2017d). Both President 
Erdoğan and PM Yıldırım also repeatedly accused the main opposition party CHP of acting 
in concert with the PKK (NTV 2017).
The AKP also capitalised on its performance legitimacy to garner support for constitutional 
change. In their rallies, both PM Yıldırım and President Erdoğan pointed to economic growth 
under the AKP governments, public investments, health-care reforms, and specific public 
projects developed in local provinces as reasons to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum. Both leaders 
promised that the new system would further improve government performance, ensuring 
more growth, employment, and investments, as well as numerous infrastructure projects 
around the country.
Finally, the AKP campaign invoked religious sentiments in favour of constitutional change. 
In his speeches Erdoğan warned the voters not to jeopardise ‘their life and afterlife’ by 
opposing the executive presidency (Yeniçağ 2017c) and identified the constitutional reform 
process as a ‘sacred journey’ (kutlu yolculuk), a phrase often used in Turkish in reference to 
the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) (Aljazeera 2017). He also argued that consenting to 
evil was itself evil—referring to the rejection of the executive presidency (Hürriyet 2017a). 
Meanwhile, his well-known piety was underlined throughout the campaign. A case in point 
concerns pictures with his grandson, showing Erdoğan teaching the Qur’an (AHaber 2017). 
Some mosques controlled by the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) also played an 
important role in the referendum as several preachers campaigned in favour of constitutional 
changes, calling the naysayers ‘traitors’ or ‘coup-plotters’ in their sermons (Almonitor 2017). 
This was clearly reminiscent of the role the mosques played on the night of the July 2016 
coup attempt and during its aftermath (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017). Further enhancing the 
fusion of Islam and politics in Turkey, columnists in the pro-AKP media identified the proposed 
changes as a defence of Islam and a struggle for the salvation of umma (community of 
Muslims).8 Hayrettin Karaman, a renowned religious scholar with significant influence over 
Erdoğan and his constituency, further argued that a ‘Yes’ vote should be seen as a religious 
duty (Karaman 2017).
This discourse was further pronounced over the course of a diplomatic crisis with several 
EU member states, particularly the Netherlands, in the midst of the campaign. To receive 
the support of the diaspora voters, the AKP government organised rallies in a number of 
European countries, most of which cancelled the events due to security concerns (T24 2017e). 
Meanwhile, the Dutch government denied access to Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Çavuşoğlu, 
and declared the Minister of Family and Social Affairs Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya persona non 
grata after expelling her to Germany along with her aides, when she tried to enter the country 
via the German-Dutch border (T24 2017f ). This diplomatic crisis allowed the AKP to 
successfully internationalise the campaign (Dunham & Hintz 2017). It not only generated a 
popular backlash in Turkey and triggered a set of angry responses by AKP cabinet members 
as well as President Erdoğan (Henley 2017), but also lent support to AKP’s portrayal of 
naysayers as a coalition of ‘enemies of the people’ within and outside of Turkey. Evoking the 
fear of encirclement and nationalist fervour meshed with religious sentiments among 
conservative Turks, Erdoğan depicted the referendum as a response to the European Union, 
which allegedly acts as ‘a crusader alliance’ (Hürriyet 2017b).
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MHP: for a stronger Turkey under an executive presidency
Unlike the 2010 referendum campaign, during which the governing AKP received support 
from numerous parties and political groups (Ciddi 2011), the constitutional amendments 
voted in 2017 encountered widespread opposition from the political class. As mentioned 
above, only the ultra-nationalist MHP and two minor parties supported the constitutional 
amendments.9 Even the Islamist SP (Felicity Party - Saadet Partisi)10 rejected the constitutional 
amendments, portraying the proposed system as dictatorial (Hürriyet 2017c). The ultra-
nationalist MHP, established in the 1970s, has remained as a minor party with fluctuating 
electoral support over the years. Since the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, however, the MHP 
had become a vocal opponent of the government expressing strong criticism of the AKP’s 
Kurdish policies and Erdoğan’s call for a presidential system.11 Given this strong criticism of 
Erdoğan in recent years, the MHP leader’s support for the constitutional change met with 
utmost surprise among the political establishment.
Many theories abound to account for the long-time MHP leader Bahçeli’s recent turnaround 
but few can explain his rationale in clear terms. One such argument suggests that Erdoğan’s 
decision to terminate the Kurdish peace process in 2015 brought the two parties closer on 
a common Turkish conservative-nationalist platform. Another argument attributes Bahçeli’s 
decision to his weakness in the party in relation to his opponents. According to this view, 
Bahçeli lent support to the constitutional amendments in exchange for the government’s 
help in thwarting his rivals. Lastly, some mention the existence of a post-referendum 
agreement between the two parties, with the MHP getting a presidential slot as well as 
guaranteed seats in parliament and positions in the bureaucracy. In the meantime, Bahçeli 
denied that he was interested in the vice-presidency (Milliyet 2017). Regardless of his 
reasoning, Bahçeli’s open support for the ‘Yes’ side exacerbated the rifts in the MHP, limiting 
the impact of the party’s campaign. Faced with leadership challenges, embattled Bahçeli 
spent most of his campaign attacking his critics in the party and proved not to be a reliable 
ally in the ‘Yes’ camp.
The MHP organised few public rallies during the campaign and instead preferred to hold 
closed-door meetings. The MHP’s role in the campaign was to persuade undecided MHP 
voters on the necessity of the proposed system, despite Bahçeli’s strong criticisms against 
the presidential system in the past. Many rank and file members were worried that the 
constitutional amendments could lead to the imposition of a federal system, giving vast 
local autonomy to the Kurdish-populated Southeastern provinces. The MHP leadership put 
forward several arguments to assure their voters that the constitutional amendments would 
not result in Turkey’s dismemberment. First, the party stressed that the constitutional 
amendments did not constitute regime change but would merely legalise the strong 
presidency that had emerged after the switch to a directly elected presidency in 2014 (Birgün 
2017). The MHP leaders also denied the assertion that the presidential system would pave 
the way to a federal regime. On numerous occasions, the party gave assurances that the first 
four articles of the constitution would not be amended under any circumstances.
During the campaign, Bahçeli put forward two main arguments to support the ‘Yes’ side. 
First, he emphasised the need to legalise Erdoğan’s de facto power, ending the current 
constitutional chaos caused by the president’s frequent extra-constitutional political 
interventions, and bringing stability to the country in the aftermath of the failed coup. 
According to this view, Erdoğan’s recent attempts to govern directly by going beyond his 
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constitutional prerogatives created an urgent need to define the parameters of presidential 
power through wide consensus even if that meant heightened powers for the president. 
Second, Bahçeli characterised Turkey as an encircled country that is under attack by both 
foreign and domestic enemies. The ‘Yes’ vote would counter such threats by strengthening 
the political system. Interestingly, the MHP failed to keep party discipline throughout the 
campaign as many dissidents in the party joined the ‘No’ campaign. The party did not tolerate 
dissent within its ranks on the referendum: it expelled these MPs (BBC 2017) and disbanded 
many local chapters due to their open support for the ‘No’ camp.
The ‘No’ campaign
In contrast to the ‘Yes’ campaign, the ‘No’ bloc hosted a variety of actors across the ideological 
spectrum. The Islamist SP and factions within the ultra-nationalist MHP joined the secular 
CHP and pro-Kurdish HDP as well as numerous civil society organisations to defeat the 
constitutional reform at the ballot box. That said, the CHP campaign proved to be the flagship 
of the ‘No’ campaign.
CHP: against one-man rule
As the oldest political party in Turkey, the CHP represents the republican, secular, and 
modernist ideals of founding fathers like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. Receiving 
the support of a quarter of the electorate, the CHP is traditionally a party of the secular urban 
middle classes and serves as the main opposition party to the conservative agenda of the 
AKP government. Since the AKP’s victory in the November 2002 elections, Turkish politics 
has been defined by a ‘long-running kulturkampf between the secularists and the Islamic 
revivalists’ (Kalaycıoğlu 2012) whereby religiosity became a major factor in Turkish voting 
behaviour (Çarkoğlu 2007; Kalaycıoğlu 2012). By pitting religious conservative voters located 
in low-income neighborhoods against middle-class secular voters, Erdoğan managed to 
secure electoral majorities in successive elections. Receiving a high level of support from 
middle-class secularists, the CHP had turned into a regional party that has appeal primarily 
for ‘minority electoral constituencies’ in coastal areas and major cities (Magaloni 2006; Greene 
2007). Given that the combined vote share of AKP and MHP in November 2015 surpassed 
60 per cent, the CHP elites knew the ‘Yes’ vote would prevail easily in the event of polarisation 
over cultural issues during the campaign. Therefore, the main opposition party built its 
strategy on neutralising the AKP’s polarising discourse and waged a non-partisan campaign 
that appealed to voters from different political backgrounds.
The party led an effective campaign that focused on the content of the constitutional 
amendments. Kılıçdaroğlu was careful to not get into polemics with Erdoğan and defended 
the parliamentary regime without directly attacking the AKP government. The CHP leadership 
also tried to lower the stakes for AKP voters who wanted to reject the constitutional 
amendments, by arguing that the ‘No’ vote would not change the political status quo. If the 
constitutional amendments were rejected in the referendum, the party leaders pointed out, 
Erdoğan would still remain as president and the AKP as governing party. Kılıçdaroğlu publicly 
stated that his party would not challenge the legitimacy of Erdoğan’s presidency should the 
‘No’ vote prevail on 16 April.
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The CHP vehemently rejected the AKP’s claim that the presidential system could ever 
solve Turkey’s long-lasting problems. As it had done in the elections of June (Kemahlıoğlu 
2015) and November 2015 (Sayarı 2016a), the CHP portrayed the constitutional amendments 
as a deliberate plan by Erdoğan to establish his personal rule. Kılıçdaroğlu tried to draw 
parallels between the proposed regime and Turkey’s military rule between 1980 and 1983, 
based on the enormous powers given to the president in both cases. According to the CHP 
spokespeople, the proposed amendments were so comprehensive that no single person 
could ever be trusted with the exercise of such powers. Furthermore, the CHP campaign 
warned that the new system would greatly diminish parliament’s powers and render the 
legislative body ineffective against the executive president. Lastly, the nationalist (ulusalcı) 
wing of the party appealed to moderate MHP voters who were puzzled by Bahçeli’s dramatic 
shift, by suggesting that the presidential system was a prelude to the adoption of a federal 
regime.
MHP dissidents: No to MHP leadership, No to executive presidency
The main opposition CHP was not alone in the ‘No’ camp. Bahçeli’s rivals criticised the MHP’s 
decision to support the constitutional amendments and challenged the party line openly 
with a ‘Turkish Nationalists Say No Campaign’ (Yeniçağ 2017a). Former and current parliament 
members from the MHP like Meral Akşener, Ümit Özdağ, Sinan Oğan, and Koray Aydın, as 
well as numerous mid-level party officials, turned their opposition against Bahçeli into a 
campaign against the Yes side.12 Their vocal and lively campaign constituted a major blow 
to Erdoğan’s efforts to secure a clear majority in the referendum. In addition to dividing the 
MHP vote, their campaign also limited the AKP’s efforts to portray the ‘No’ camp as an alliance 
of terrorist groups like the PKK and the Gülenists (FETÖ). Given their Turkish nationalist 
backgrounds, the campaign waged by credible figures like Akşener and Özdağ made it easier 
for nationalist voters to oppose the constitutional amendments without fearing that they 
were siding with the CHP or the PKK.
The naysayers’ challenge was particularly directed at the MHP leader, Devlet Bahçeli, and 
thus became a continuation of their earlier efforts to unseat the MHP leader. During the 
campaign, these figures tried to persuade the MHP rank and file members that theirs was 
the best course of action for the party. On numerous occasions, they claimed that the 
executive presidential system to be voted for in the referendum would wipe out the MHP 
electorally since the party could only thrive against the governing AKP machine in a 
parliamentary system. Moreover, they argued that Bahçeli’s support for the constitutional 
amendments stemmed not from his desire to protect the state, as he claimed, but rather to 
protect his leadership. In particular, Akşener accused Bahçeli of putting his own political 
interests before those of the country and the party (Yurt 2017).
Among Bahçeli’s critics, Akşener and Oğan were most active in touring the country to 
hold public meetings. These events were more effective and drew larger crowds than those 
organised by the party leadership. For many mid-level MHP officials, these party members 
represented the future of the party and many did not hesitate to work together with Akşener 
and Oğan, among others. In a leader-centric party like MHP, there was no historical precedent 
to such an open challenge against the party’s sitting chairman.13 Meetings organised by 
Bahçeli’s critics frustrated the MHP leadership and led to intra-party fighting. Several events 
organised by Akşener, Oğan, and Özdağ (T24 2017g) were disrupted by pro-Bahçeli 
supporters, with the police taking only limited action (Posta 2017).
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HDP: a parliamentary system for democracy, human rights, and pluralism
The pro-Kurdish HDP was another key political actor that opposed the constitutional 
package. Established in 2012 and dominated by the Kurdish movement after the 2014 merger 
of the BDP and the HDP, the HDP attempted to go beyond its pro-Kurdish concerns by 
reaching non-Kurdish constituencies with a more inclusive and leftist platform. Indeed, as 
part of this agenda the party had adapted a strong and vocal opposition to Erdoğan’s plans 
to establish an executive presidency, and placed this issue at the centre of its electoral 
campaign in the June 2015 elections with the slogan ‘we will not make you the president’ 
(Kemahlıoğlu 2015). Partly due to its vocal opposition to a presidential system, the HDP 
became the first pro-Kurdish party to pass the national electoral threshold of ten per cent, 
thanks to critical support from the urban middle classes of Turkish origin and conservative 
Kurds. This success briefly cost the AKP its parliamentary majority, which the government 
had maintained since 2002.
In the wake of the June 2015 election, both the government and the PKK withdrew from 
the already stalled peace process and a cycle of violence erupted in urban centres in the 
Southeast. The AKP government responded to the PKK’s insurgent attacks with long-lasting 
curfews and other urban counter-insurgency measures. Over the course of this conflict, 321 
civilians died, 100,000 civilians were displaced, and about a million others were affected by 
the destruction of city centres (Aydın & Emrence 2016). Aydın and Emrence find that the AKP 
government selected curfew towns among the HDP strongholds and not necessarily among 
the foci of insurgent activity. The strategically imposed curfews, the authors claim, led to 
increased votes for the AKP and reduced support for the HDP in the November 2015 snap 
elections.
The government, reluctant to distinguish the legal political party HDP from the PKK which 
is proscribed as a terrorist organisation, targeted the HDP’s organisational infrastructure and 
crippled the party in the wake of the July 2016 coup attempt. The parliament voted to lift 
the parliamentary immunity of several MPs, and as a result 13 HDP MPs, including the two 
co-chairpersons, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, were imprisoned. Throughout 
the referendum campaign the HDP leaders and 11 other MPs were in prison awaiting trial. 
Moreover, the security forces raided several HDP local offıces and arrested hundreds of mid-
level party officials throughout the campaign cycle. Furthermore, the AKP government, using 
the emergency law as a pretext, took over 84 municipal governments governed by mayors 
belonging to the pro-Kurdish DBP (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi - Democratic Regions Party) 
due to their alleged ties to the PKK; all the mayors were arrested (OSCE 2017).
Thus in clear contrast to its vibrant June 2015 campaign, HDP’s referendum campaign 
was much weaker and less lively. At the outset, the party expressed its opposition to the 
referendum package and voted against the new draft in the parliament. However, the party’s 
opposition did not translate into a strong presence on the campaign trail. As anticipated, 
the themes of the HDP campaign revolved around issues of democracy, human rights, and 
pluralism. The party highlighted the government crackdown on the opposition in general 
and the Kurdish movement in particular due to the emergency law in effect since July 2016. 
The HDP criticised the draft constitution for bringing one-man rule, centralisation of power 
in the office of the presidency, and a conservative-nationalist and sexist political vision in 
line with the ideological alignment between the AKP and the MHP. The party was particularly 
concerned with the decreasing power of parliament and the president’s increasing power 
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over the legislative and judicial branches. Hence the HDP referred to this draft as an updated 
version of the 1982 Constitution and an instrument to institutionalise Erdoğan’s de facto 
executive presidency. The party argued that this draft was a far cry from a civilian and 
democratic constitution with an emphasis on decentralisation, democratisation, pluralism, 
women’s rights, and ecological concerns (HDP 2017). Finally, the party reinforced the overall 
sentiment among the Kurdish people that the constitutional package had no benefits or 
promises for Kurds at a time of violence in the Southeast.
Uneven playing field
Despite its flaws and occasional military coups, Turkish democracy was commendable up 
until recently in the free, fair, and regular elections held since 1950. The playing field was 
broadly even and systematic electoral fraud was nonexistent. With the AKP’s rise to dominance 
and its authoritarian direction after 2011, however, the playing field in Turkey tilted in favour 
of the ruling party to create a competitive authoritarian regime (Esen & Gümüşçü 2016; 
Özbudun 2015; Sayarı 2016b). As a result, recent elections have been marred by the ruling 
party’s disproportionate access to the media and to private and by public resources and 
increasing politicisation of the state institutions. This referendum was no exception. Indeed 
the emergency law in effect since July 2016 exacerbated many of these trends over the 
course of the referendum cycle (OSCE 2017).
While the ‘Yes’ campaign benefitted from extensive resources and media support, the ‘No’ 
campaign faced serious resource disadvantages, constant harassment from public officials, 
and limited access to the media as well as public space. The president and prime minister 
held large gatherings for official ceremonies financed by the state budget; most of these 
gatherings turned into campaign rallies attended by public sector employees and students 
who were required to attend (OSCE 2017, pp. 7–8). Meanwhile, the emergency law particularly 
proved to be instrumental in restricting the freedom of assembly and the opposition’s access 
to public spaces.
State officials erected a number of hurdles on the campaign trail for the No bloc. While 
these restrictions targeted the entire ‘No’ campaign, regardless of different parties’ ideological 
positions, the pro-Kurdish HDP was particularly hard hit. Indeed, the YSK decided that civil 
society organisations and associations could not run campaigns and recognised only ten 
political parties as eligible to campaign (OSCE, 2017). Despite being one of the eligible 
parties, public space was severely restricted for the pro-Kurdish party, in line with the AKP’s 
rhetoric that the ‘No’ vote would be supporting ‘the PKK-HDP camp’. As already discussed, 
the co-chairpersons of the HDP were imprisoned along with 11 more MPs; thousands of 
officials of the HDP local chapters were arrested, ultimately stripping the party of its voice 
and ability to run an effective campaign. To debilitate the HDP campaign even further, public 
officials continued the crackdown on the party by banning its campaign song and towing 
away its campaign vehicles.
Those actors in the ‘No’ campaign without a legal organisational standing or campaign 
eligibility were particularly vulnerable to such pressures. For instance, the opposition figures 
within the MHP became a primary target. Provincial governors denied naysayers in the MHP 
permits for rallies and meetings in several cities—Ankara, Denizli, Niğde among them—using 
the emergency law as a pretext (Cumhuriyet 2017c; Yeniçağ 2017b). In other cities, such as 
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Çanakkale and Edirne for instance, where Akşener could obtain a permit, local figures denied 
access to their facilities or logistical support in conference rooms (T24 2017g).
Along similar lines, more than hundred activists from political parties and associations 
were detained over the course of the referendum cycle for security reasons (OSCE 2017). 
Several individuals hanging posters and banners opposing the presidential system were 
given fines for vandalism. Furthermore, naysayers were physically attacked during 
campaigning by pro-government vigilantes, especially in AKP-dominated areas (OSCE 2017: 
8). Finally, the governor of Ankara banned all protests in January 2017, shutting the public 
space in the capital city to citizens until the referendum.
Equally important, media access was restricted for almost all naysayers to different 
degrees. Οn the five television stations which the OSCE monitored throughout the campaign 
period, the ‘Yes’ campaign featured in 76 per cent of airtime devoted to the campaign as 
opposed to 23.5 per cent for the ‘No’ campaign (OSCE 2007: 11). In the ‘No’ camp, the HDP 
(0.6 per cent) and the MHP naysayers were almost completely absent from mainstream 
media, while the CHP (19 per cent) could find limited opportunities to appear on national 
networks. The airtime on national stations, however, was clearly allocated in favour of the 
ruling party (33.5 per cent). Not surprisingly, the stakeholders filed numerous complaints to 
the YSK and RTÜK (Radio Television Supreme Board – Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu) – but 
to no avail, for an executive decree (No. 687) dated 9 February 2017 had repealed the YSK’s 
authority to sanction the media in order to ensure equal airtime for different parties over 
the course of the campaign.14,15
Last but definitely not least, the YSK further pushed the playing field in favour of the AKP. 
First, the Board moved polling stations in predominantly Kurdish areas and relocated them 
in distant villages dominated by pro-government rangers. This relocation undermined 
citizens’ access to the ballot boxes and impeded the HDP’s capacity to mobilise its 
constituency. Second, among the approximately half a million people, who had to flee from 
their homes after July 2015 due to escalating violence between the PKK and the state and 
the government’s counter-insurgency measures, voter registration was limited (OSCE 2017: 
6). Third, in some Kurdish towns and villages, such as Hakkari, Batman, Siirt and Nusaybin, 
the YSK disqualified hundreds of election observers from the HDP (and the CHP) ranks, 
leaving many ballot box committees without opposition monitoring (Cumhuriyet 2017d).
More importantly, during the voting process on election day the YSK made changes in 
the vote counting procedures and accepted all unstamped ballots as valid – upon the AKP’s 
request – thus rendering the entire process vulnerable to fraud by lifting a critical safeguard 
(CNNTürk 2017). This decision was unprecedented and in clear violation of the stipulations 
of electoral law (Seçim Kanunu 1961). Indeed the YSK had ruled in favour of unstamped 
ballots in the past but such decisions had been taken on a case-by-case basis at the level of 
individual polling stations, and not as a blanket pass for all unstamped ballots. Although 
there is no reliable data on the geographical or vote distribution of unstamped ballots, it is 
safe to claim that the slim difference between the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ vote substantially raised the 
stakes of YSK’s decision. This last minute change created a significant stir within the opposition 
and led to questioning of the legitimacy of the referendum results (New York Times 2017). 
Regardless of its impact on the outcome, the YSK’s decision to validate unstamped ballots 
undermined the credibility of the process and trust in the electoral institutions and the rule 
of law.
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Referendum results
The 2017 referendum campaign was hard-fought between the two camps, as evidenced by 
the close margin of victory for the ‘Yes’ campaign. In Turkey itself, 24.3 million voters (51.2 
per cent) cast their ballot for ‘Yes’ against 23.1 million ‘No’ voters (48.8 per cent). Among 
diaspora voters, who constitute approximately five per cent of the overall electorate, support 
for the ‘Yes’ camp was higher, at 58.4 per cent. The inclusion of the diaspora vote marginally 
increased the margin of victory for the ‘Yes’ camp to 51.4 per cent. At 87.3 per cent, the 
turnout rate far exceeded levels seen in the 2010 constitutional referendum16 and the 2014 
presidential elections. The provinces with the highest turnout were located in the Aegean 
region, while those in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country had much lower 
rates (Table 3). Given that tens of thousands of people were forced to vacate their houses 
after the start of military operations in the region against the PKK in summer 2015, the lower 
rates in Kurdish-populated provinces should not come as a surprise.
As shown in Table 4, the ten provinces with the highest percentage of ‘No’ votes are located 
in geographically and politically diverse parts of the country, namely the CHP strongholds 
in the Thrace and Aegean provinces (Kırklareli, Edirne, Muğla, and İzmir) coupled with the 
heavily Kurdish-populated Southeastern provinces (Şırnak, Diyarbakır, and Hakkari). 
Meanwhile, the ‘Yes’ vote peaked in the socially conservative and economically 
underdeveloped Eastern Black Sea, Central and Eastern Anatolian provinces, where the AKP 
has been dominant since 2002 (Figure 2).
Table 3. provinces with the highest and lowest turnout rates in the turkish referendum of april 2017 (%).
Lowest turnout Highest turnout
Province % Province %
ağrı 71.1 Bilecik 90.5
Gümüşhane 73.1 Manisa 90.4
Van 75.4 amasya 90.3
iğdır 76.8 denizli 90.3
Kars 78.0 Çanakkale 90.3
Bingöl 78.1 Kütahya 90.2
Bitlis 78.5 uşak 90.2
Muş 79.0 düzce 90.1
ardahan 79.9 Kırklareli 90.0
diyarbakır 80.7 ankara 89.8
Table 4. highest ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes in the turkish referendum of april 2017 by province.
NO YES
Province % of the vote Province % of the vote 
tunceli 80.4 Bayburt 81.7
Şırnak 71.7 rize 75.5
Kırklareli 71.3 aksaray 75.5
Edirne 70.5 Gümüşhane 75.2
Muğla 69.3 Erzurum 74.5
İzmir 68.8 yozgat 74.3
diyarbakır 67.6 Kahramanmaraş 73.9
hakkari 67.6 Çankırı 73.5
iğdır 65.2 Konya 72.9
aydın 64.3 Bingöl 72.6
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There was a high degree of variation in vote distribution among the country’s seven 
regions (see Table 5). The ‘Yes’ vote reached its highest levels in the AKP’s traditional 
strongholds, namely the Black Sea (62.6 per cent), Central Anatolia (58.5 per cent), and 
Eastern Anatolia (57.6 per cent) regions. In the heavily Kurdish-populated Southeast Anatolia 
region, the ‘Yes’ vote came out on top (52.9 per cent) but with a smaller margin. By contrast, 
the ‘Yes’ vote decreased in the more developed and secular Aegean (39.8 per cent) and 
Mediterranean (46.1 per cent) as well as Marmara (49.2 per cent) regions. Compared to the 
2010 constitutional referendum, which passed with 58 per cent of the voter, the ‘Yes’ vote 
was lower in all seven regions.
The ‘Yes’ bloc, composed of AKP and MHP, seems to have lost over 10 per cent of its 
electoral strength since the November 2015 general elections. In a constitutional referendum, 
not all voters can be expected to follow their party line but the gap was quite significant in 
this case. The ‘Yes’ vote was lower than these parties’ combined vote share in all but 13 cities, 
as seen in Table 6. These 13 cities are all located in East and Southeast Anatolian regions and 
many are currently administered by government-appointed mayors, who replaced the 
Kurdish mayors during the state of emergency. This regional anomaly, coupled with the 
unstamped ballot decision and the state efforts to block HDP observers, caused some alarm 
about the reliability of these results in the area.
Of the 68 cities where the referendum vote for ‘Yes’ vote was lower than the AKP-MHP 
vote in November 2015, the drop exceeded 10 per cent of the vote share in 47 of them. In 
Osmaniye (23.5 per cent), Kırşehir (21.7 per cent), and Kırıkkale (20.8 per cent), which are 
Table 5. results of the turkish constitutional referendums of 2010 and 2017 by region (%).
Regions
YES NO
2010 2017 2010 2017
Marmara 53.2 49.2 46.8 50.8
aegean 43.8 39.8 56.2 60.2
Black Sea 64.4 62.6 35.6 37.4
central anatolia 63.9 58.5 36.1 41.5
Eastern anatolia 81.3 57.6 18.7 42.4
Southeastern anatolia 84.0 52.9 16.0 47.0
Mediterranean 48.7 46.1 51.3 53.8
Table 6.  largest decline in aKp-Mhp support from the november 2015 elections to the april 2017 
referendum by province (%).
Province
2015 November elections 2017 referendum
AKP MHP TotalAKP+MHP Yes votes
Difference between 
2017 Yes vote and 
Nov 2015 AKP-MHP 
support
osmaniye 46.8 34.6 81.3 57.8 −23.5
Kırşehir 50.7 24.3 74.9 53.3 −21.7
Kırıkkale 62.3 20.9 83.2 62.4 −20.8
Kilis 65.6 18.4 84.0 64.1 −19.9
Karabük 60.5 19.8 80.3 60.7 −19.6
Burdur 50.6 19.7 70.3 51.8 −18.6
antalya 41.3 17.6 58.9 40.9 −18.0
uşak 46.6 18.2 64.8 47.0 −17.7
isparta 53.2 20.4 73.6 56.0 −17.6
Çankırı 69.1 21.7 90.8 73.4 −17.4
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historically MHP electoral strongholds (Osmaniye is Bahçeli’s hometown), the decrease was 
over 20 per cent. The ‘Yes’ camp partly recovered these results by scoring major victories in 
centres of Anatolian business like Gaziantep (62.5 per cent), Şanlıurfa (70.8 per cent), Erzurum 
(74.5 per cent), Konya (72.8 per cent), Kocaeli (56.7 per cent), and Kayseri (67.8 per cent), 
among others. Even in these provinces, however, the ‘Yes’ vote did not match the AKP and 
the MHP’s vote share in the November 2015 general elections.
This data shows the aggregate changes in votes after the November 2015 general 
elections but the party preferences of individual voters are not available. We cannot therefore 
estimate from this data exactly what percentage of the ‘Yes’ vote came from the AKP and 
the MHP as well as other parties. A cursory look at the results suggests that the ‘Yes’ vote 
generally matched the AKP’s vote share in the November 2015 general elections. According 
to opinion polls, anywhere between half and two-thirds of MHP voters reportedly defied 
their leaders by choosing ‘No’ in the referendum (KONDA 2017). Even if we assume that not 
a single MHP member voted ‘Yes’, which is not improbable, the ‘Yes’ vote was still below the 
AKP vote share in the November 2015 general elections in several major provinces, such as 
İstanbul, Antalya, Bursa, Denizli, and Eskişehir (see Figures 1 and 2).
Many analysts interpreted these results as a Pyrrhic victory for the governing party, given 
the unequal playing field during the campaign. Despite limited resources and airtime, the 
‘No’ side came within reach of victory in the referendum. Moreover, the ‘No’ vote was the 
clear winner in metropolitan cities and economically developed parts across the country. 
For instance, it prevailed in five out of the six most populous provinces (Bursa was the only 
exception). In coastal provinces like Mersin (35.9 per cent), Antalya (40.9 per cent), İzmir (31.2 
per cent), and Adana (41.8 per cent), the ‘Yes’ vote did not even surpass the 45 per cent level. 
The most surprising outcome of the referendum, however, was the No victory in the country’s 
top two cities, namely İstanbul (51.4 per cent) and Ankara (51.2 per cent) both of which are 
run by AKP municipal governments.
As expected, the ‘No’ votes attained high scores in many parts of Southeastern and Eastern 
Anatolia due to the HDP opposition. However, the ‘No’ vote remained below the HDP’s vote 
share in the November 2015 general elections across the region (Table 7). In fact, this is the 
only region where the ‘Yes’ vote surpassed the combined vote share of the parties in the ‘Yes’ 
camp. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the swing of conservative Kurdish 
voters, who may have supported the constitutional amendments due to Erdoğan’s high 
popularity. Second, some voters in the region may have reacted negatively to the HDP’s 
failure to curb the PKK’s attacks since the June 2015 general elections. Third, we need to note 
that the referendum was held under extraordinary conditions in the region as a result of the 
state of emergency. Particularly in districts where the HDP or DBP mayors were replaced by 
government-appointed trustees, the number of invalid votes was high and the electoral 
turnout was lower than the national average (KONDA 2017). After the government’s 
operations forced thousands of families to migrate out of these areas, population dynamics 
have changed. Lastly, we cannot exclude the possibility of electoral irregularities and voter 
fraud, especially in districts currently run by government-appointed trustees.
Several factors played a role in the surprisingly high ‘No’ vote in the referendum. First, 
voters seem to have reacted negatively to the recent economic slowdown that has seen 
growth rates fall since 2012 (Kalaycıoğlu 2017; Sayarı 2016a). Since the 2016 failed coup, 
political instability and growing authoritarianism further eroded consumer and investor 
confidence—with perverse effects for the party’s low-income base. Indeed, scholars of 
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Turkish politics suggest that economic satisfaction plays an important role in the voting 
behaviour of the Turkish electorate (Başlevent et al. 2005 and 2009; Çarkoğlu 2008; Kalaycıoğlu 
2010). For ideologically moderate voters who value economic stability, the party’s recent 
policies were a cause for concern. Some commentators suggest that the AKP base has 
witnessed a bifurcation between, on the one hand, lower-middle and middle class voters in 
metropolitan areas, who are very concerned about political stability and economic growth, 
and on the other hand low-income voters in small towns, rural areas, and the peripheral 
neighborhoods of metropolitan cities, who are dependent on social assistance provided by 
the governing party (Çakır 2017). The referendum results, they argue, demonstrated rising 
discontent with the AKP’s policies among the first group of voters. According to opinion 
polls, while an overwhelming majority of the AKP voters nonetheless cast their ballots for 
‘Yes’, a small number of AKP voters chose ‘No’ (KONDA 2017: 51). The CHP’s depolarising 
campaign also contributed to this process by lowering the stakes for the ‘No’ vote.
Conclusion
The close margin of victory was an upset for President Erdoğan and the ruling AKP, who 
could not turn their enormous resource advantages along with the MHP’s support into a 
clear mandate for the executive presidency. Opinion polls suggest that the majority of MHP 
voters rejected the proposed amendments, while the AKP’s campaign drew lacklustre 
support in some of its strongholds in metropolitan cities, resulting in a ‘No’ victory in five 
out of the six most populous cities. Moreover, the referendum results were overshadowed 
by serious allegations of electoral fraud that may have altered the outcome. Given the uneven 
playing field, the high ‘No’ vote boosted opposition morale and is viewed as a setback for 
Erdoğan. The CHP’s energetic campaign particularly kept the ideologically diverse ‘No’ camp 
together under heavy government pressure. At a time when the HDP’s organisation crumbled 
against a barrage of government attacks and Bahçeli’s MHP sided with Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu’s 
moderate stance allowed the CHP to lead the ‘No’ campaign.
Regardless, the referendum will change the Turkish political system in fundamental ways. 
The new system will transfer power away from parliament to the president, contributing to 
the ongoing personalisation of executive power. For instance, the legislative body will no 
longer be able to take a vote of confidence on the government or oversee government 
actions and will share its prerogatives with the president on numerous policy areas. With 
weak institutional checks, Erdoğan, if re-elected in 2019, will continue his monopolisation 
of power, wielding direct influence over the legislative body and his party. Accordingly, 
Table 7. Major Kurdish cities: comparing the 2015 november election results with ‘no’ votes in the april 
2017 referendum (%).
City
2015 November elections (%) 2017 referendum (%)
CHP HDP Total ‘No’ votes
Şırnak 1.1 85.5 86.6 71.7
Mardin 1.3 68.4 69.7 69.3
diyarbakır 1.6 72.8 74.4 67.6
Batman 1.2 68.1 69.3 63.6
Siirt 1.6 58.3 59.9 42.2
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Erdoğan will continue to govern the country through executive decrees, bypassing the 
parliament, as he had done since the failed coup attempt. The parliament had become an 
ineffective body even before the referendum but the adoption of sweeping powers for the 
president may turn it into a rubber-stamp institution.
The new system is likely to reshape the political landscape. Under the executive presidency, 
the largest two parties will be in a strong position to gather votes from minor parties, 
particularly in presidential elections. In particular, the MHP may turn out to be this system’s 
biggest loser. In the near future, the MHP leadership will face an uphill struggle to retain 
those voters disillusioned by Bahçeli’s strong support for Erdoğan’s AKP. Given the MHP’s 
current state, many of its voters may flock to the AKP and the CHP, or to the new nationalist 
centre-right party formed by MHP dissident (at the time of writing the party still had no 
name). By contrast, despite government attacks and electoral setbacks, the pro-Kurdish HDP 
will probably maintain enough of its popular base to cross the ten per cent electoral threshold 
in parliamentary elections but would have a lesser impact on the presidential elections, 
much like the MHP.
The erosion of parliament’s powers might encourage some AKP voters to vote for an 
opposition party in the legislative elections to restrain the powerful president and hold the 
ruling AKP accountable for its poor economic performance. Given the AKP’s razor-thin 
electoral majority, Erdoğan may win the presidency but lose his party’s majority in the 2019 
elections. Paradoxically, the very outcome that President Erdoğan has tried to avoid by 
amending the Constitution, namely incongruence between the executive and legislative 
branches, may materialise under the new system. This ‘cohabitation’ scenario would most 
likely generate a gridlock in parliament and could even trigger a constitutional crisis between 
the president (provided that Erdoğan wins the 2019 presidential election) and the parliament, 
as recently seen in Venezuela. To avert this outcome, the AKP may resort to a new electoral 
system that favours the incumbent party at the expense of the opposition.
Erdoğan orchestrated the constitutional amendments to end political uncertainty by 
taking over the reins of the ruling party while still president. The ‘executive’ presidential 
model has given Erdoğan this opportunity. However, the narrow victory for the ‘Yes’ side 
indicated that consolidating and unifying the nationalist and conservative voters will be 
harder than Erdoğan expected. His overtures to Bahçeli did not lead him to win over the 
majority of the MHP voters, while still costing him Kurdish votes. Furthermore, Erdoğan’s 
efforts to monopolise power and to limit dissent pushed opposition figures to act in concert 
during the referendum campaign. Subsequently, Kılıçdaroğlu’s ‘Justice Walk’ from Ankara to 
İstanbul to protest the conviction and arrest of a CHP MP was supported by a wide array of 
political parties and groups such as the HDP, MHP dissidents, and ÖDP (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma 
Partisi - Freedom and Solidarity Party) along with civil society organisations and professional 
associations like DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - the Confederation of 
Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey), KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - the 
Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions) and TMMOB (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları 
Birliği - the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects), among others. Nearly 
half of the electorate voted against the constitutional amendments establishing Erdoğan’s 
personal rule. Although they hail from different ideological backgrounds, opposition to the 
new regime could bring this heterodox group of voters together behind a popular candidate 
against Erdoğan, especially in the second round of the 2019 presidential election. While still 
unlikely, this scenario cannot be ruled out completely in the aftermath of the referendum.
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The AKP will therefore need to prevent the consolidation of the opposition bloc by 
neutralising or appeasing political elites who might throw in their lot with the official 
opposition CHP. In the coming year, the government needs to improve its economic 
performance to minimise any potential conflicts within its popular base and win the local, 
parliamentary, and presidential elections—all scheduled for 2019. The ruling AKP is still the 
favourite in these elections but faces growing risks as Erdoğan tries to monopolise power. 
His quest to remain in office against growing societal opposition may plunge Turkey into a 
deeper form of authoritarianism characterised by harsher constraints on civil liberties, a 
crackdown on opposition politicians and the media, and wider use of state coercion against 
anti-government protestors.
Notes
1.  For more on polarisation, see Aydın-Düzgit & Balta 2017
2.  In 2014, the BDP merged with the HDP.
3.  The first four articles of the 1982 Constitution define the Turkish state as a secular democratic 
republic based on the rule of law and Ataturk’s nationalism, and designates Turkish as its official 
language and Ankara as its capital.
4.  For the full text of the amendments, see https://www.trtworld.com/referendum/18-ways-the-
turkish-constitution-might-change-334921
5.  As a counter-measure, a CHP MP broadcast the parliamentary talks via internet, reaching only 
internet savvy citizens (Habertürk 2017a).
6.  The BBP received 0.6 percent of the votes in the November 2015 elections. Hüda-Par had nine 
independent candidates in the June 2015 elections, receiving 68,000 votes in total and decided 
not to run in November 2015.
7.  FETÖ (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü - Fethullahist Terror Organisation) refers to the Hizmet movement 
of US-based preacher Fethullah Gülen, who is accused by Turkish authorities of orchestrating 
the coup attempt in July 2016. DHKP-C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi - Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party/Front) is a radical left wing organisation. The PKK (Partiya Karkaren 
Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers Party), founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, has launched an 
insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984 and the conflict, committing more than 30,000 
lives, is yet to be resolved.
8.  For an example see Kayadibi 2017.
9.  The BBP leaderʼs decision to support the ʽYesʼ side met with resistance among the party ranks 
and led to open revolt in the partyʼs (only) electoral stronghold, Sivas province (Hürriyet 2017d).
10.  The SP won 0.7 per cent of the vote in November 2015.
11.  For more on the MHP see Aytürk 2014, Önis 2003.
12.  For a short interview with Akşener on her campaign strategy, see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rNBYkb6httQ&t=2072s
13.  On the party’s historical roots, see Aytürk 2014.
14.  The YSK issued 580 fines, mostly to pro-AKP media, for not giving enough airspace to the 
opposition in the November 2015 elections. (Resmi Gazete 2017).
15.  In September 2010, the AKP called a national referendum on a series of constitutional 
amendments, presented as part of a single package. While some of its provisions expanded 
individual rights and associational liberties, others allowed the ruling party to change the 
composition of the Constitutional Court and the board that oversee judicial appointments. 
These changes subsequently undermined the rule of law, eroded the system of checks and 
balances, and skewed the political playing field in favour of the AKP. For more on the 2010 
referendum, see Ciddi 2011 and Kalaycıoğlu 2012.
16.  Elections under authoritarian regimes are considered as a tipping game in which citizens 
become more likely to vote for a candidate if they think that others will act in a similar fashion 
(Van de Walle cited in Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009).
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